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FISHER, Circuit Judge. 
Although Maher Terminals, LLC (“Maher”) 
challenges the rent it must pay under its lease agreement (“the 
Lease”) with the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey 
(“the Port Authority”), this case is not a typical landlord-
tenant dispute. Maher, a landside marine terminal operator, 
asserts that the rent due under the Lease violates the U.S. 
Constitution’s Tonnage Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, 
as well as two related federal statutes, all of which historically 
have concerned taxes and fees imposed on vessels, their 
owners, and their passengers and crews. The District Court 
dismissed Maher’s complaint in its entirety, reasoning that 
Maher’s rent obligations did not violate the Tonnage Clause 
or its related statutes, and that Maher failed to establish 
admiralty jurisdiction for its remaining tort claim. We agree 
and hold that landside service providers like Maher are not 
within the class of plaintiffs that the Tonnage Clause or its 
related federal statutes were intended to protect, that is, they 
are outside each law’s zone of interests. Accordingly, we will 
affirm. 
I. 
Maher is a marine terminal operator with its principal 
place of business in Elizabeth, New Jersey. Maher’s primary 
business is to load and unload cargo on vessels—also known 
as stevedoring—and to berth vessels at its terminal. The Port 
Authority is an entity created by a compact between New 
York and New Jersey with the consent of Congress. The Port 
Authority oversees various transportation systems and, of 
most relevance to this appeal, the Port of New York and New 
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Jersey, the third largest seaport in North America and the 
largest maritime cargo center on the eastern seaboard.1 
The Port Authority leases many of its marine terminal 
facilities at the Port of New York and New Jersey to private 
companies like Maher, which in turn directly manage the 
terminals and provide stevedoring services to ships using 
those terminals. In October 2000, Maher signed a thirty-year 
lease with the Port Authority to rent the largest marine 
terminal at Port Elizabeth, consisting of 445 acres of 
improved land including structures and a berthing area.  
The Lease divides Maher’s rent into two categories. 
First, the “Basic Rental” charges Maher a fixed rate per acre 
of the terminal. When the complaint was filed in 2012, the 
Basic Rental was $50,413 per acre, totaling $22,433,612 for 
the year. The second form of rent—and this is the crux of the 
case—is the “Container Throughput Rental” (“Throughput 
Rental”), which is a variable charge based on the type and 
volume of cargo that is loaded and unloaded at Maher’s 
terminal. For the first eight years of the Lease’s term, Maher 
was exempted from paying any Throughput Rental. Since 
2008, the Throughput Rental has been calculated based on the 
following formula: the first 356,000 containers loaded and 
unloaded by Maher are exempted from any fees; for 
containers 356,001 to 980,000, Maher pays a per-container 
fee set forth by a schedule in the Lease ($19.00 per container 
when the complaint was filed); and for each container over 
980,000, Maher pays a lower fee ($14.25 per container when 
the complaint was filed).  
In addition, Maher must load and unload a minimum 
amount of cargo annually as a condition of maintaining the 
                                              
1 Individual appellee Patrick Foye is the Port 
Authority’s Executive Director.  
 5 
 
Lease (420,000 containers when the complaint was filed, 
which is subject to increase to 900,000 containers upon 
completion of certain harbor improvements), and Maher must 
pay an annual guaranteed minimum Throughput Rental 
equivalent to loading and unloading 775,000 containers 
(subject to the exemption for the first 356,000 containers), 
regardless of the number of containers Maher actually 
handles. All told, Maher paid roughly $12.5 million in 
Throughput Rental in 2010, and it expected the 2012 
Throughput Rental to increase to $14 million.  
According to Maher, the Port Authority profits from 
the Lease. The Port Authority also allegedly uses revenue 
from the Lease to fund harbor-improvement projects as well 
as projects wholly unrelated to the services that the Port 
Authority provides to Maher or vessels using the port.   
In September 2012—nearly twelve years after the 
Lease’s effective date—Maher sued the Port Authority in the 
U.S. District Court for the District of New Jersey. Maher’s 
complaint alleged violations of the U.S. Constitution’s 
Tonnage Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3; the Rivers and 
Harbors Appropriation Act (“RHA”), 33 U.S.C. § 5(b); and 
the Water Resources Development Act (“WRDA”), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 2236. Maher also asserted a negligence claim against the 
Port Authority for the way it established and collected fees.  
The Port Authority moved to dismiss the complaint 
under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, and in July 2014, the District Court granted 
the motion. The District Court reasoned that Maher lacked 
standing to bring its Tonnage Clause and RHA claims 
because it was not a protected vessel. Even if Maher had 
standing, the Tonnage Clause and RHA claims still failed, the 
District Court held, because Maher did not adequately plead 
that any fees imposed on vessels were not for services 
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rendered. The District Court also dismissed Maher’s WRDA 
claim because Maher had not shown that the Port Authority 
imposed fees on vessels or cargo and because the WRDA did 
not prohibit the Port Authority from using revenue from the 
Lease to finance harbor-improvement projects. Finally, the 
District Court decided that it lacked admiralty jurisdiction 
over Maher’s negligence claim and declined to exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over the claim. Maher filed this 
timely appeal.2   
II. 
The District Court exercised jurisdiction only under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331, concluding that it lacked admiralty 
jurisdiction over Maher’s negligence claim under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1333(1) and declining to exercise supplemental jurisdiction 
over that claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367. We have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
Regardless of whether the District Court dismissed 
Maher’s complaint for failure to state a claim or for lack of 
jurisdiction, our standard of review is the same: we exercise 
plenary review over the District Court’s order. Kaymark v. 
Bank of Am., N.A., 783 F.3d 168, 174 (3d Cir. 2015) (failure 
to state a claim); Constitution Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 
                                              
2 While Maher has been litigating this case, it has also 
been disputing the Lease’s terms before the Federal Maritime 
Commission. See Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. 
& N.J., No. 08-03, 2014 WL 7328474 (FMC Dec. 17, 2014). 
The FMC concluded that the Port Authority did not violate 
the Shipping Act, 46 U.S.C. § 40101, by giving an 
unreasonable preference to another terminal or imposing an 
unreasonable prejudice on Maher based on the terms of the 
Lease, including the minimum Throughput Rental. Id. at *1, 
*24. 
 7 
 
F.3d 347, 356 n.12 (3d Cir. 2014) (lack of jurisdiction, 
including lack of standing). And because any jurisdictional 
challenge here is facial, in either circumstance, we apply the 
same standard the District Court did, accepting as true the 
facts alleged in the complaint and drawing reasonable 
inferences in Maher’s favor. Kaymark, 783 F.3d at 174; 
Aichele, 757 F.3d at 356 n.12, 358 (distinguishing facial 
attacks on jurisdiction from factual ones). We also may 
consider documents that are “integral to or explicitly relied 
upon in the complaint,” In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), such as the Lease here.  
With respect to Maher’s negligence claim, we review 
the District Court’s determination of its own admiralty 
jurisdiction de novo, Sinclair v. Soniform, Inc., 935 F.2d 599, 
601 (3d Cir. 1991), but we review the Court’s refusal to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state law claims for 
abuse of discretion, Figueroa v. Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 
F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 1999).      
III. 
The central question on appeal is whether fees 
imposed on landside entities like Maher can support claims 
under the Tonnage Clause, the RHA, and the WRDA. A 
secondary question is whether the District Court correctly 
decided that it lacked admiralty jurisdiction, and declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Maher’s negligence 
claim. We address these issues in turn. 
A. 
 The U.S. Constitution prohibits states from “lay[ing] 
any Duty of Tonnage” without the consent of Congress. U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3. Maher alleges that several fees 
imposed by the Lease, but principally the Throughput Rental, 
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violate the Tonnage Clause.3  Maher contends that the District 
Court incorrectly concluded that Maher lacked standing to 
bring a Tonnage Clause claim and that Maher did not 
adequately plead a violation of the Tonnage Clause.  
 Standing involves “constitutional limitations on 
federal-court jurisdiction” on the one hand and “prudential 
limitations” on the other. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 
(1975). Here the District Court concluded that Maher’s 
Tonnage Clause claim failed for lack of standing, but the 
Court did not explain whether its holding was based on 
constitutional or prudential limitations. We read the District 
Court’s opinion as relying on prudential limitations, not 
                                              
3 On appeal, Maher also challenges the Cargo Facility 
Charge (“CFC”), which requires “a user of cargo handling 
services” to pay a fee “to the Port Authority, which will be 
collected by the terminal operator handling the user’s cargo 
[i.e., Maher] for remittance to the Port Authority.” J.A. 345. 
The Port Authority correctly points out that Maher’s 
complaint only obliquely refers to the CFC, and that Maher 
did not raise the CFC before the District Court. At oral 
argument, counsel for Maher argued that the minimum 
volumetric guarantee, which we understand to be part of the 
Throughput Rental, also violates the Tonnage Clause. As 
explained below, however, the categories of fees challenged 
by Maher are ultimately unimportant because they do not 
change the fact that Maher is not a vessel or its representative 
and therefore cannot state a claim under the Tonnage Clause, 
the RHA, or the WRDA.  
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constitutional ones.4 The District Court made no reference to 
the requirements of constitutional standing, instead explaining 
that Maher lacked standing because it was “not a vessel or 
other protected entity under the Tonnage Clause.” Maher 
Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., Civ. No. 2:12-
6090 KM, 2014 WL 3590142, at *8 (D.N.J. July 21, 2014). In 
other words, the District Court concluded that Maher fell 
outside the class of plaintiffs who are protected by the 
Tonnage Clause. In so doing, the District Court effectively 
conducted a zone-of-interests analysis. See Lexmark Int’l, Inc. 
                                              
4 In any event, we have no trouble concluding that 
Maher has constitutional standing to bring its claims. 
“Constitutional standing has three elements: injury in fact, 
causation, and redressability.” Shalom Pentecostal Church v. 
Acting Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 783 F.3d 156, 161 
(3d Cir. 2015) (citing Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 
555, 560–61 (1992)). Here the Port Authority argues that 
Maher suffers no injury in fact from fees that Maher passes 
on to vessels. This argument is unpersuasive. Maher is 
responsible for the fees regardless of whether it passes them 
on to vessels. See Bacchus Imps., Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 
267 (1984) (concluding that wholesalers had alleged an 
economic injury caused by a tax that they were liable to pay 
even if they could pass on the tax to customers). This 
conclusion applies to all of Maher’s claims. To the extent the 
District Court’s analysis was based on constitutional standing, 
see Maher Terminals, LLC v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., Civ. 
No. 2:12-6090 KM, 2014 WL 3590142, at *8 & n.11 (D.N.J. 
July 21, 2014) (discussing Rule 12(b)(1) dismissal), the 
District Court was wrong. Still, we may affirm on any 
grounds supported by the record. Tourscher v. McCullough, 
184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).  
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v. Static Control Components, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1377, 1387 
(2014) (framing the zone-of-interests test as asking whether a 
particular plaintiff “falls within the class of plaintiffs” 
authorized to sue under a particular law). 
 We have previously categorized the zone-of-interests 
requirement as one of three components of prudential 
standing. E.g., Freeman v. Corzine, 629 F.3d 146, 154 (3d 
Cir. 2010).5 But in Lexmark International, Inc. v. Static 
Control Components, Inc., the Supreme Court criticized the 
placement of the zone-of-interests requirement within the 
rubric of prudential standing. 134 S. Ct. at 1387 
(“[P]rudential standing is a misnomer as applied to the zone-
of-interests analysis.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see 
also Shalom Pentecostal Church, 783 F.3d at 163 n.7. The 
Court clarified that the zone-of-interests requirement goes to 
whether a particular plaintiff has a cause of action under a 
given law, not a plaintiff’s standing. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 
1387. Though Lexmark was decided only a few months 
before the District Court’s decision in this case, we agree with 
Maher that Lexmark strongly suggests that courts shouldn’t 
link the zone-of-interests test to the doctrine of standing and 
that the District Court erred by apparently doing so here. But 
putting aside the label that applies to the zone-of-interests 
test, we agree with the District Court that Maher still must 
satisfy this test to state a Tonnage Clause claim and, as 
explained below, that Maher fails the test.  
                                              
5 The other two components of prudential standing are 
that a plaintiff first must “assert his or her own legal interests 
rather than those of third parties,” and second must not assert 
“generalized grievances” that require courts to “adjudicat[e] 
abstract questions.” Freeman, 629 F.3d at 154 (internal 
quotation marks and brackets omitted).   
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 In applying the zone-of-interests test, we must discern 
the meaning and purpose of the Tonnage Clause using 
traditional methods of interpretation and ask whether it 
extends to Maher’s claim. Cf. id. at 1388–89 (analyzing the 
meaning and purposes of the Lanham Act to determine the 
interests protected by the Act). We have applied the zone-of-
interests test “liberal[ly]” and have noted “that it is not meant 
to be especially demanding.” Oxford Assocs. v. Waste Sys. 
Auth. of E. Montgomery Cnty., 271 F.3d 140, 146 (3d Cir. 
2001) (internal quotation marks omitted). The test is 
particularly generous in the context of challenges to agency 
actions under the Administrative Procedure Act, but it may be 
less so in other contexts. Lexmark, 134 S. Ct. at 1389.   
Turning to the Tonnage Clause’s meaning, “we are 
guided by the principle that the Constitution was written to be 
understood by the voters; its words and phrases were used in 
their normal and ordinary as distinguished from technical 
meaning.” District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 576 
(2008) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted). 
Although the Constitution appears to speak broadly by 
prohibiting states from “lay[ing] any Duty of Tonnage,” the 
term “Duty of Tonnage” had a well-known meaning to the 
founding generation. It referred to the common commercial 
practice of taxing “a ship . . . according to ‘the internal cubic 
capacity of a vessel,’ i.e., its tons of carrying capacity.” Polar 
Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 557 U.S. 1, 6 (2009) (quoting 
Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks Comm’n, 
296 U.S. 261, 265 (1935)). Further, tonnage duties referred to 
taxes “on the privilege of access by vessels to the ports of a 
state” and “were distinct from fees . . . for services facilitating 
commerce.” Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265.  
To the Framers, the Tonnage Clause supported and 
shared a purpose with the Import-Export Clause, U.S. Const. 
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art. I, § 10, cl. 2, which generally prohibits states from taxing 
imports and exports. See Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 
264–65. The purpose of the Import-Export Clause, in turn, 
was to prevent states with convenient ports from taxing goods 
travelling in commerce at the expense of consumers in less-
fortunately located states. See Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 7. 
The Framers understood that the Import-Export Clause could 
be effectively “nullified” “[i]f the states had been left free to 
tax the privilege of access by vessels to their harbors.” Clyde 
Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265; accord S.S. Co. v. 
Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 31, 34–35 (1867). Although 
there was some disagreement about whether the Commerce 
Clause already prohibited tonnage duties, Clyde Mallory 
Lines, 296 U.S. at 265 n.1, the Tonnage Clause was adopted 
to “prevent that nullification” and to further restrain states 
from obtaining “geographical vessel-related tax advantages,” 
Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 7. 
To effectuate these purposes, the Supreme Court has 
interpreted the Tonnage Clause to prohibit more than only 
classic tonnage duties, i.e., taxes on a ship based on the ship’s 
capacity; the Court has also said that a state cannot “‘do that 
indirectly which she is forbidden . . . to do directly.’” Id. at 8 
(alteration in original) (quoting Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 
How.) 283, 458 (1849)). Thus, the Tonnage Clause prohibits 
taxes that vary according to ratios other than a ship’s 
capacity, such as the number of masts, mariners, or 
passengers. Id. It likewise prohibits taxes that are imposed not 
just on the vessel itself but also on the ship captain, owner, 
supercargo (the person in charge of the cargo on the ship), 
and passengers. Id.; Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 
458–59. The Clause even prohibits flat taxes on a ship—those 
that do not vary according to tonnage—if they are for the 
privilege of entering a port. Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 
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34–35. In sum, the Tonnage Clause’s prohibition “embrace[s] 
all taxes and duties regardless of their name or form, and even 
though not measured by the tonnage of the vessel, which 
operate to impose a charge for the privilege of entering, 
trading in, or lying in a port.” Clyde Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. 
at 265–66. 
Consistent with the original understanding of tonnage 
duties, the Tonnage Clause does not prohibit states from 
charging vessels “for services rendered to and enjoyed by the 
vessel, such as pilotage, or wharfage, or charges for the use of 
locks on a navigable river, or fees for medical inspection.” Id. 
at 266 (citations omitted). Charges for such services, even 
those that vary according to tonnage, are constitutional for at 
least two reasons. First, they are not taxes—which are 
assertions of sovereignty—but are instead demands for 
reasonable compensation—which are assertions of a right of 
property. Packet Co. v. Keokuk, 95 U.S. 80, 85 (1877). 
Second, charges for services are constitutional because they 
facilitate, rather than impede, commerce. See Clyde Mallory 
Lines, 296 U.S. at 265–66; Keokuk, 95 U.S. at 84 (“[A charge 
for services rendered] is not a hindrance or impediment to 
free navigation.”). 
Of course, a state may not escape the Tonnage 
Clause’s reach merely by labelling a tax as a charge for 
services. Keokuk, 95 U.S. at 86; Cannon v. City of New 
Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577, 580 (1874) (“A tax which is 
. . . due from all vessels arriving and stopping in a port, 
without regard to the place where they may stop, . . . cannot 
be treated as a compensation for the use of a wharf.”). Vessels 
that pay a purported services charge must actually receive a 
proportionate benefit in return. See State Tonnage Tax Cases, 
79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 204, 220 (1870) (striking down a tax 
because it was “an act to raise revenue without any 
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corresponding or equivalent benefit or advantage to the 
vessels taxed”). So it is constitutional for a state to demand 
“just” and “reasonable compensation” for services rendered, 
Cannon, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 582, but the inverse must also 
be true: a state may not demand unjust and unreasonable 
compensation for services, even if services are actually 
rendered. Additionally, a reasonable charge for general 
services that benefit all ships that enter a port, such as 
policing services for a harbor, is constitutional, see Clyde 
Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 266–67, but a tax that has a 
“general, revenue-raising purpose” is probably not, see Polar 
Tankers, 557 U.S. at 10.  
From this discussion, we conclude that the Tonnage 
Clause was meant to protect vessels as vehicles of commerce. 
See Keokuk, 95 U.S. at 84–85 (“[The Tonnage Clause] was 
designed to guard against local hindrances to trade and 
carriage by vessels . . . .” (emphasis added)). Tonnage duties 
were originally understood as taxes on vessels, and the 
modern formulation from Clyde Mallory Lines and Polar 
Tankers extending the Clause to all “charge[s] for the 
privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port” does 
nothing to change the fundamental object of the provision. 
The body of law surrounding the services exception to the 
Tonnage Clause drives home the point. Fees for services are 
allowed because they do not impede a vessel’s free navigation 
in commerce and are only levied when a “passing vessel” 
elects to use those services, see Keokuk, 95 U.S. at 85, a 
concern that is plainly inapplicable to non-vessel plaintiffs. 
Therefore, to come within the Tonnage Clause’s zone of 
interests, we hold that a plaintiff must allege an injury to a 
vessel as a vehicle of commerce.  
Our conclusion does not conflict with the Supreme 
Court’s admonition that the Tonnage Clause prohibits indirect 
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tonnage duties and, consequently, extends to taxes imposed 
not only on a vessel, but also on an owner, ship captain, 
supercargo, or the passengers; to the contrary, the two are 
very much consistent. Though these people are obviously not 
ships, the Tonnage Clause prohibits taxes imposed on them 
because they are representatives of ships. See Passenger 
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 458 (“It is . . . a duty on the vessel 
. . . . It is a taxation of the master, as representative of the 
vessel and her cargo.”). And unlike the landside provider of 
harbor services, these people travel with the ships moving as 
vehicles in commerce. As discussed above, the Tonnage 
Clause protects the rights of vessels to navigate free of local 
hindrances by prohibiting charges that the vessels do not 
choose to incur. Just as a tax on a vessel impedes the vessel’s 
ability to freely move in commerce, taxes on the people on 
board the vessel have the same effect. Taxes on certain people 
(the owner, captain, supercargo, and crew) directly impact 
where a vessel decides to make port by taxing those 
responsible for the vessel’s navigation, and taxes on 
passengers will likely indirectly impact a vessel’s decisions 
by reducing demand for passage on the vessel. The interests 
of these people are the same as the interests of the vessels 
they occupy, so the Tonnage Clause prohibits taxes on them 
just as it prohibits taxes on the vessels themselves.   
As a landside marine terminal operator challenging the 
rent it owes under the Lease, Maher is not a member of the 
class of plaintiffs that can state a claim under the Tonnage 
Clause. Maher’s injury is not an injury to a vessel or its 
representative. Unlike a fee imposed on a vessel or the people 
on board, a fee imposed on Maher does not in and of itself 
impact a vessel’s ability to freely navigate in commerce. Fees 
imposed on Maher affect vessels only if Maher passes on such 
fees to vessels that use its terminal for stevedoring services. 
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That it is not enough for Maher to satisfy the zone-of-interests 
test. A party may not contract its way into a law’s zone of 
interests if that party does not itself have any protected 
interests under the law. Cf. Freeman, 629 F.3d at 157 
(“[P]laintiffs who allege only that a party with whom they 
contract is subject to an undue burden on its ability to freely 
participate in interstate commerce are not within the zone of 
interests protected by the dormant Commerce Clause.” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). To hold otherwise would 
allow parties to evade the first prudential standing 
requirement: that parties must assert their own legal interests, 
not the interests of third parties. See id. at 154. Therefore, the 
Tonnage Clause is not concerned with taxes on any entity that 
has some relationship with vessels; rather, it prohibits taxes 
that are directed at vessels or their representatives. Vessels 
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may be able to challenge Maher’s rent,6 but Maher cannot 
assert the rights of third-party vessels.7  
                                              
6 We do not hold that vessels or their representatives 
could never challenge tonnage duties that are passed through 
a private entity like Maher.  
7 Although third-party standing—standing to assert the 
legal interests of third parties—is allowed in “exceptional” 
circumstances, Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 750 (3d Cir. 
1991), Maher did not seek third-party standing here, mostly 
because it did not believe it needed to allege that the vessels 
paid the tonnage duties in this case. But even if Maher had 
made a third-party standing argument, it would have failed. In 
deciding whether Maher should have third-party standing, we 
consider, inter alia, (1) whether Maher had a close 
relationship with the third-party vessels and (2) whether the 
third-party vessels faced some obstacles to bringing their own 
lawsuits. See Pa. Psychiatric Soc’y v. Green Spring Health 
Servs. Inc., 280 F.3d 278, 288–89 (3d Cir. 2002). Maher does 
not appear to have the requisite close relationship with the 
allegedly-injured vessels. Fifteen years ago, Maher agreed to 
the Throughput Rental that it now claims violates the vessels’ 
rights under the Tonnage Clause. Additionally, there are 
limited obstacles to vessels asserting their own claims under 
the Tonnage Clause if they believe they are paying 
unconstitutional tonnage duties. Finally, and perhaps most 
fundamentally, it is unclear from Maher’s complaint whether 
any vessels are actually paying unconstitutional tonnage 
duties. Maher’s allegations about passing on the fees to the 
vessels are quite vague, and Maher does not adequately allege 
that the vessels are paying unreasonable fees for the services 
they receive from Maher (the services provider) as a result of 
the rent due under the Lease.  
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We are unpersuaded by Maher’s argument that it 
satisfies the zone-of-interests test because it is “engaged in 
interstate commerce” and “seek[s] to vindicate interests 
related to the protection of interstate commerce.” Maher Br. 
32 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
For support, Maher relies on cases applying the zone-of-
interests test in the context of the dormant Commerce Clause. 
See Freeman, 629 F.3d at 156–57; Oxford Assocs., 271 F.3d 
at 146. Though the Tonnage Clause supports the Commerce 
Clause (as well as the Import-Export Clause), the Tonnage 
Clause is not the Commerce Clause. The Tonnage Clause 
protects the free flow of commerce through a specific 
means—by protecting vessels operating as vehicles of 
commerce.  
Nor is Maher within the Tonnage Clause’s zone of 
interests because it pays fees that vary according to the 
volume of cargo moving through its port. In Polar Tankers, 
the Supreme Court said that the tax at issue there was “at the 
heart of what the Tonnage Clause forbids.” 557 U.S. at 10. It 
did so in part because the tax “depend[ed] on a factor related 
to tonnage,” i.e., a ship’s cargo capacity, in that it applied to 
vessels only of a certain size. Id. But other cases teach us that 
whether a fee varies according to tonnage is not actually the 
touchstone of unconstitutional tonnage duties. See Clyde 
Mallory Lines, 296 U.S. at 265-66 (holding that the Tonnage 
Clause prohibits “all taxes and duties regardless of their name 
or form, and even though not measured by the tonnage of the 
vessel, which operate to impose a charge for the privilege of 
entering, trading in, or lying in a port” (emphasis added)); 
Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 35 (holding that the 
Tonnage Clause prohibits “fixed” fees as well as fees that 
vary with vessels’ capacity (emphasis added)). We therefore 
do not read Polar Tankers or any of the Tonnage Clause 
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precedent as standing for the proposition that any fee on 
anyone or anything that varies according to cargo volume is 
an unconstitutional tonnage duty, as Maher does. What 
actually made the tax in Polar Tankers unconstitutional, and 
what Maher cannot show here, is that the tax was directed at 
vessels and was not in exchange for services. See 557 U.S. at 
10 (noting that “the tax applie[d] only to large ships” and was 
“not for services provided to the vessel[s]”). The same is true 
of Bridgeport & Port Jefferson Steamboat Co. v. Bridgeport 
Port Authority, where the Second Circuit struck down a fee 
imposed on all passengers of a ferry under the Tonnage 
Clause. 567 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2009). Although the tax in 
Bridgeport varied depending on whether the passenger was a 
person or vehicle, the tax was unconstitutional, in our view, 
because it was directed at a vessel’s passengers.    
If we unmoor the Tonnage Clause from taxes on 
vessels and allow landside entities to bring Tonnage Clause 
claims, we would transform the Tonnage Clause into a broad 
“Maritime Commerce Clause.” Landside entities having some 
relationship to maritime commerce would be able to 
challenge not only volumetric charges like the one here, but 
any unreasonable state-imposed fees for the privilege of being 
in a port. See Portwardens, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) at 35 (“It was 
not only a pro rata tax which was prohibited, but any duty . . . 
.”). So, for example, a restaurant renting state property in a 
port that serves food to mariners fresh off a vessel could state 
a claim under the Tonnage Clause by claiming that its rent is 
unreasonably high given the services provided by the state. 
We doubt the Framers intended the Tonnage Clause to sweep 
so broadly as to transform these and other landlord-tenant 
disputes into constitutional questions, especially given the 
conspicuous absence of vessels and cargo owners from this 
case complaining about the fees they are paying at the Port of 
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New York and New Jersey.8 Although the Tonnage Clause 
should be interpreted in light of its general purposes of 
preventing nullification of the Import-Export Clause and 
stopping states from obtaining geographic advantages by 
taxing vessels, these purposes do not give us license to 
transform the Tonnage Clause into something it is not and 
was never intended to be.  
In sum, while we hold that the District Court should 
not have couched its conclusion in terms of standing after 
Lexmark, we agree with the District Court’s essential holding: 
Maher, as a landside entity, is outside the Tonnage Clause’s 
zone of interests. This is not, as Maher contends, to elevate 
form over substance. Anchoring the Tonnage Clause to taxes 
on vessels and their representatives is the only way to 
preserve the Clause’s meaning. Accordingly, Maher failed to 
state a Tonnage Clause claim.  
B. 
Maher next challenges the District Court’s dismissal of 
its RHA claim. Under the RHA, taxes and fees from non-
Federal interests (like the Port Authority) cannot be “levied 
upon or collected from any vessel or other water craft, or 
from its passengers or crew,” except for, inter alia, 
“reasonable fees charged on a fair and equitable basis that – 
                                              
8 State, Department of Natural Resources v. Alaska 
Riverways, Inc., 232 P.3d 1203 (Alaska 2010), is not to the 
contrary. There the Alaska Supreme Court struck down a per-
passenger fee under the RHA that was assessed against a boat 
company ostensibly as rent for using unimproved shoreland. 
Id. at 1221. Unlike the plaintiff in that case, Maher is not a 
vessel operator so it does not have any independent interests 
protected by the Tonnage Clause or the RHA, its statutory 
equivalent. 
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(A) are used solely to pay the cost of a service to the vessel or 
water craft; (B) enhance the safety and efficiency of interstate 
and foreign commerce; and (C) do not impose more than a 
small burden on interstate or foreign commerce.” 33 U.S.C. § 
5(b).  
By its terms, the RHA only applies to taxes and fees 
imposed on or collected from vessels, their passengers, or 
their crews. As a landside terminal, Maher is none of these 
and therefore cannot state a claim under the RHA. Maher 
itself recognizes that the RHA codifies the body of law 
surrounding the Tonnage Clause. Accordingly, we hold that 
Maher’s RHA claim fails for the same reasons as its Tonnage 
Clause claim, and for the additional reason that the plain 
language of the RHA is explicitly limited to categories of 
entities that do not include Maher.  
C. 
 We also reject Maher’s argument that the District 
Court incorrectly dismissed its WRDA claim. The WRDA 
grants the consent of Congress to certain tonnage duties and 
cargo fees to finance harbor-improvement projects provided 
that such fees are imposed in accordance with the WRDA’s 
requirements. 33 U.S.C. § 2236(a). Among other things, the 
WRDA permits the collection of fees only after the project 
has been completed. Id. § 2236(a)(1). Before fees may be 
imposed under the WRDA, there must be notice and a public 
hearing on the proposed fees, id. § 2236(a)(5), and the non-
Federal interest must publicly file a schedule of harbor fees 
with the Federal Maritime Commission, id. § 2236(a)(6)(A). 
The WRDA allows “[a]ny person who . . . is . . . aggrieved by 
. . . a proposed scheme or schedule of port or harbor dues 
under this section . . . to seek judicial review of that proposed 
scheme or schedule,” provided that the action is brought 
 22 
 
within 180 days of the hearing required by § 2236(a)(5). Id. 
§ 2236(b)(2).  
 Maher’s WRDA claim fails for two reasons. First, the 
WRDA expressly applies only to fees imposed on vessels and 
on cargo. Here Maher is challenging neither. Granted, the 
Lease calculates Maher’s rent based in part on the amount of 
cargo moving through Maher’s terminal, but Maher’s rent is 
not a fee on the cargo itself. Nor is it a tonnage duty, as 
explained above.  
 Second, we agree with the Port Authority that Maher 
has no WRDA claim because the Port Authority never even 
purported to impose rent on Maher pursuant to the WRDA. 
The WRDA provides a limited private right of action to 
persons “aggrieved by . . . a proposed scheme or schedule of 
port or harbor dues under this section” and only allows for 
“judicial review of that proposed scheme or schedule.” Id. § 
2236(b)(2) (emphasis added). Additionally, the 180-day time 
limit for bringing a WRDA claim is tied to the date of the 
public hearing required by the WRDA. Id. Because there is 
no WRDA schedule of fees for us to review, Maher has no 
WRDA claim.  
 Maher argues that such a reading of the WRDA is 
“preposterous,” Maher Reply Br. 21, but we disagree. 
Nothing in the WRDA prohibits non-Federal interests from 
raising revenue in ways other than tonnage duties and cargo 
fees to finance harbor-improvement projects, as the Port 
Authority is allegedly doing in this case. Moreover, the 
WRDA merely provides congressional consent to tonnage 
duties and cargo fees that meet the WRDA’s other 
requirements. In other words, it is a safe harbor for what 
would otherwise be unconstitutional duties. If a non-Federal 
interest imposes tonnage duties or cargo fees that do not 
comport with the WRDA’s requirements, those duties and 
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fees would not have the consent of Congress, and the remedy 
would be a direct challenge under the Tonnage Clause or the 
Import-Export Clause.  
 Therefore, we hold that Maher cannot state a claim 
under the WRDA. 
D. 
 Finally, we address Maher’s negligence claim. The 
District Court concluded that it lacked federal admiralty 
jurisdiction over the claimYea,  under 28 U.S.C. § 1333(1) 
and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the 
claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.  
 A proponent of admiralty jurisdiction for “a tort claim 
must satisfy conditions both of location and of connection 
with maritime activity.” Jerome B. Grubart, Inc. v. Great 
Lakes Dredge & Dock Co., 513 U.S. 527, 534 (1995). To 
satisfy the location test, “the tort [must have] occurred on 
navigable water or . . . [an] injury suffered on land [must have 
been] caused by a vessel on navigable water.” Id. “[T]he tort 
occurs where the alleged negligence took effect.” Exec. Jet 
Aviation, Inc. v. City of Cleveland, 409 U.S. 249, 266 (1972) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  
 Maher’s claim of negligence is that the Port Authority 
“negligently establish[ed] and collect[ed] charges and fees for 
the use of Maher’s terminal . . . upon such bases and in such 
amounts as are unlawful.” J.A. 49. Put simply, any negligence 
by the Port Authority occurred on land. Maher and the Port 
Authority are land-based entities. The Lease was negotiated 
on land, and payments were made on land. Accordingly, 
Maher cannot satisfy the location test for admiralty 
jurisdiction, so its claim arises not under federal law but state 
law.  
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 And because the District Court correctly dismissed all 
of Maher’s federal claims over which it possessed original 
jurisdiction, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
when it declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over 
Maher’s state-law negligence claim. See Hedges v. Musco, 
204 F.3d 109, 123 (3d Cir. 2000) (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 
1367(c)(3)).  
IV. 
For the reasons set forth above, we will affirm the 
order of the District Court.9 
                                              
9 Based on our resolution of the case on the above-
stated grounds, we do not reach the Port Authority’s 
alternative arguments that Maher’s claims are untimely. 
  
Maher Terminals, LLC v. The Port Authority of NY and NJ, et 
al., No. 14-3626 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in 
part: 
 
 Although I concur in my colleagues’ resolution of 
Maher’s statutory and tort claims, I respectfully dissent from 
their conclusion that Maher has not stated a constitutional 
claim.  The Majority Opinion runs contrary to a long line of 
Supreme Court precedent interpreting the Tonnage Clause.  
Most recently, in Polar Tankers, Inc. v. City of Valdez, 
Alaska, 557 U.S. 1 (2009), the Court reaffirmed its broad 
reading of that clause as prohibiting state and local 
governments from doing indirectly what they may not do 
directly, namely, lay a tax on shipping.  Id. at 8.  The 
Tonnage Clause forbids any attempt – “regardless of [its] 
name or form”, id. – to raise revenue by charging duties on 
maritime commerce.  That, however, is precisely what Maher 
alleges is the effect of the “Container Throughput Rental” 
assessments it must pay under the terms of its lease with the 
Port Authority.  The assessments are a tax on the stevedores 
working with the vessels and will be passed on to the vessels, 
according to Maher.  While those allegations may ultimately 
prove unfounded, I believe that Maher has pled sufficient 
facts to survive a motion to dismiss.  I would therefore vacate 
the District Court’s dismissal of the Tonnage Clause claim as 
to the Container Throughput Rental assessments. 
 
 The Constitution declares that “No State shall, without 
the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage … .”  U.S. 
Const., art. I, § 10, cl. 3.  My colleagues correctly note that 
the word “tonnage” literally refers to the “entire internal 
  
cubical capacity, or contents of the ship or vessel expressed in 
tons of one hundred cubical feet … .”  In re State Tonnage 
Tax Cases, 79 U.S. 204, 212 (1870).  The term “‘was used by 
the framers because at that day and time it was the customary 
mode of measuring the value of a ship.’”  Erik M. Jensen, 
Quirky Constitutional Provisions Matter: The Tonnage 
Clause, Polar Tankers, and State Taxation of Commerce, 18 
Geo. Mason L. Rev. 669, 683 (2011) (quoting Samuel 
Freeman Miller, Lectures on the Constitution of the United 
States 253 (photo reprint 1980) (New York & Albany, Banks 
& Bros. 1891)).  But the Tonnage Clause has long since been 
extended to address taxation beyond the narrow reach 
inherent in that definition.  It had to be, because, “taken in 
this restricted sense, the constitutional provision would not 
fully accomplish its intent.”  So. Steamship Co. of New 
Orleans v. Portwardens, 73 U.S. 31, 34 (1867).  It was 
designed to support the Constitution’s Import-Export Clause, 
which, as its name suggests, bars states from placing duties 
on imports or exports.1  In re State Tonnage Tax Cases, 79 
U.S. at 215 (“Tonnage duties are as much taxes as duties on 
imports or exports, and the prohibition of the Constitution 
extends as fully to such duties if levied by the States as to 
duties on imports or exports, and for reasons quite as strong 
                                              
 1 The Import-Export Clause provides, “No State shall, 
without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or 
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely 
necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net 
Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on 
Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the 
United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the 
Revision and Controul of the Congress.”  U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 10, cl. 2. 
  
as those which induced the framers of the Constitution to 
withdraw imports and exports from State taxation.”).  By its 
very nature, the Tonnage Clause also serves the fundamental 
purpose of the Commerce Clause,2 ensuring federal control 
over matters of interstate and foreign commerce.  See Dept. of 
Revenue of State of Wash. v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 
435 U.S. 734, 754 (1978).  In fact, James Madison “was of 
the opinion that the commerce clause independently 
restrained the states from imposing duties of tonnage.”  
Plaquemines Port, Harbor & Terminal Dist. v. Fed. Mar. 
Comm’n, 838 F.2d 536, 546 (D.C. Cir. 1988).  Nonetheless, 
the Tonnage Clause was added to the Constitution and so 
provided, along with the Import-Export Clause, a set of bars 
to complement the Commerce Clause barricade against state 
meddling in matters of national and foreign commerce.3  
These three clauses in combination – the Commerce Clause, 
the Import-Export Clause, and the Tonnage Clause – are 
                                              
 2 The Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to 
“regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the 
several States, and with the Indian Tribes.”  U.S. Const. art. I, 
§ 8, cl. 3. 
 
 
3 By including the Tonnage Clause, certain delegates 
to the Convention worried that it “would imply the opposite 
[– that states could otherwise impose a tonnage duty –] and 
put the states in a worse position,” Plaquemines, 838 F.2d at 
546, but the Supreme Court has long rejected the notion that 
the absence of an express prohibition on states means that 
“any other commercial regulation, not expressly forbidden, to 
which the original power of the State was competent, may 
still be made,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 200 
(1824) (Marshall, C.J.). 
  
meant to enhance the federal government’s power to speak 
with one voice on matters of trade, to protect federal import 
revenues from state diversion, and to avoid discord among the 
states.  See Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 285-
86 (1976). 
 
The purposes meant to be accomplished by 
constitutional provisions, however, may not come easily or 
naturally.  Self-interest is a powerful countervailing force.  In 
the context of maritime commerce, that has manifested itself 
in repeated efforts by state and local authorities to circumvent 
the Tonnage Clause, often by merely calling a tax something 
else or moving the aim of it from a ship to a related target.  
The Supreme Court has been vigilant in recognizing and 
rejecting such creativity.  “A State cannot take what would 
otherwise amount to a tax on the ship’s capacity and evade 
the Clause by calling that tax ‘a charge on the owner or 
supercargo,’[4] thereby ‘justify[ing] this evasion of a great 
principle by producing a dictionary or a dictum to prove that a 
ship-captain is not a vessel, nor a supercargo an import.’”  
Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8 (alteration in original) (quoting 
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283, 459 (1849) (Grier, 
J., concurring)).  Put differently, an indirect tax on shipping is 
just as offensive as a direct one.  “The States cannot lay 
export duties, nor duties on imports, nor tonnage duties on 
vessels.  If they tax the master and crew, they indirectly lay a 
duty on the vessel.  If the passengers on board are taxed, the 
                                              
 4 A “supercargo” is “[a] person specially employed and 
authorized by a cargo owner to sell cargo that has been 
shipped and to purchase returning cargo, at the best possible 
prices; the commercial or foreign agent of a merchant.”  
Black’s Law Dictionary 1575 (9th ed. 2009). 
  
protected goods – the imports – are reached.”  Passenger 
Cases, 48 U.S. at 452 (Catron, J., concurring) (emphasis 
added).  The allegations in this case present only the latest 
example of a self-interested local authority trying to tax 
commerce. 
 
 In levying its assessment upon the landside marine 
terminal operator rather than the vessel or its representatives, 
the Port Authority is playing the exact labeling game that the 
Framers of our Constitution intended to foreclose by adopting 
the Tonnage Clause.  The Port Authority is indirectly taxing 
vessels, and thus the goods on those vessels, by moving the 
locus of its assessments somewhere else, in this instance, to 
the water’s edge.  We ought not permit this.  My colleagues 
accept the argument that “the Tonnage Clause was meant to 
protect vessels” (Majority at 15), which is true, as far as it 
goes.  But the Clause was never meant simply to protect 
vessels as such.  The Framers were not worried about boats.  
They were worried about provincialism and protecting 
national control of commercial activity so that there would be 
a free flow of goods between the states and with other 
nations.5  They understood basic economics, including the 
                                              
5 The Majority’s reasoning gains no traction by 
invoking the “zone of interests” test.  In Commerce Clause 
cases, as the Majority recognizes, “we have advocated a 
liberal employment of the zone of interests test, explaining 
that it is not meant to be especially demanding.”  Oxford 
Assocs. v. Waste Sys. Auth. of E. Montgomery Cnty., 271 F.3d 
140, 146 (3d Cir. 2001) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
The bar of the “zone of interests” test is so low that it is 
satisfied by plaintiffs who merely “seek to vindicate interests 
related to the protection of interstate commerce.”  Freeman v. 
  
way that indirect taxes on shipping would, if allowed, enrich 
coastal states at the expense of inland states.  In the Federalist 
Papers, Alexander Hamilton noted that “[i]mposts, excises, 
and, in general, all duties upon articles of consumption, may 
be compared to a fluid, which will, in time, find its level with 
the means of paying them.”  The Federalist No. 21.  The very 
fact that the Framers felt the Tonnage Clause was necessary 
as a backstop to the Import-Export Clause demonstrates their 
recognition of the illusory distinction between direct and 
indirect taxes on goods. 
 
 In the end, they knew, any charge on shipping – 
whether on the goods themselves, the vessels conveying the 
goods, or on some other surrogate for the vessels and goods – 
would be passed on to consumers.  The citizens of one state 
                                                                                                     
Corzine, 629 F.3d 146, 157 (3d Cir. 2010) (emphasis added).  
It would be odd, then, for the Tonnage Clause to have such a 
distinctly difficult “zone of interest” test, since the two 
clauses address the same concern. 
In any event, the notion that Maher is not within the 
“zone of interests” of the Tonnage Clause is untenable.  
Maher’s marine container terminal is the largest in the Port of 
New York and New Jersey, Maher unloads about one million 
ocean-shipping containers every year, and it paid $12.5 
million in Container Throughput Rental assessments in 2010 
alone.  It is one of the world’s largest multi-user marine 
container terminal operators, and has been operating at Port 
Elizabeth for over 60 years.  The Tonnage Clause seeks to 
protect against local assessments that impose a charge on 
maritime trade.  Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8.  Maher’s 
position as a major stevedoring business is thus more than 
enough to satisfy the “zone of interests” test. 
  
would benefit to the detriment of the citizens of another, and 
commerce would be impeded.  According to Hamilton, “[t]he 
maxim that the consumer is the payer, is so much oftener true 
than the reverse of the proposition, that it is far more 
equitable that the duties on imports should go into a common 
stock, than that they should redound to the exclusive benefit 
of the importing States.”  The Federalist No. 35.  Were such a 
tax on shipping permitted, whatever its guise, it would be 
“productive of inequality among the States; which inequality 
would be increased with the increased extent of the duties.”  
Id.  As a consequence, “the assumption of most founders was 
that … an indirect tax is one which the ultimate consumer can 
generally decide whether to pay by deciding whether to 
acquire the taxed product” – in other words, the assumption 
was that indirect taxes will get passed on to consumers in the 
form of higher prices.  Erik M. Jensen, The Apportionment of 
“Direct Taxes”: Are Consumption Taxes Constitutional, 97 
Colum. L. Rev. 2334, 2395 (1997). 
 
 For that reason, when an assessment is a revenue-
raising tax on the privilege of “entering, trading in, or lying in 
port,” Clyde Mallory Lines v. Alabama ex rel. State Docks 
Comm’n, 296 U.S. 261, 265-66 (1935), and not a reasonable 
reimbursement for services rendered, it constitutes an 
impermissible duty of tonnage because it undermines federal 
control over commerce, regardless of the target of the 
assessment.6  Hence, “[t]he prohibition of a duty of tonnage 
                                              
 6 It bears mention that the Tonnage Clause is one of 
the few limitations of the Constitution that is not absolute but 
instead only disallows states from enacting such duties 
“without the Consent of Congress.”  U.S. Const., art. I, § 10, 
cl. 3.  The Port Authority is thus free to seek an Act of 
  
should … be construed so as to carry out [its] intent.  A mere 
adherence to the letter, without reference to the spirit and 
purpose, may in this case mislead as it has misled in other 
cases.”  Keokuk N. Line Packet Co. v. City of Keokuk, 95 U.S. 
(5 Otto) 80, 87 (1877). 
                                                                                                     
Congress permitting the fees at issue here.  Indeed, the Water 
Resources Development Act itself is specifically styled as 
congressional consent to impose an otherwise-impermissible 
duty of tonnage.  See 33 U.S.C. § 2236(a).  Rather than 
foreclose all such taxes, the Tonnage Clause operates to move 
decision-making over duties of tonnage to Congress, thereby 
ensuring its control over matters of national commerce.  The 
potential permissibility of such taxes, with congressional 
assent, makes plain “the necessity of a rigid adherence to the 
demands of” the Tonnage Clause.  Cannon v. City of New 
Orleans, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 577, 583 (1874).   
If hardships arise in the enforcement of this 
principle, and the just necessities of a local 
commerce require a tax which is otherwise 
forbidden, it is presumed that Congress would 
not withhold its assent if properly informed and 
its consent requested.  This is a much wiser 
course, and Congress is a much safer depositary 
of the final exercise of this important power 
than the ill-regulated and overtaxed towns and 
cities, which are not likely to look much beyond 
their own needs and their own interests.  
Id.  By upholding the assessment levied here, the Majority 
forecloses the need for cooperative federalism and instead 
permits the Port Authority to make the decision alone, 
without proper input from Congress. 
  
 Unfortunately, the Majority has been misled.  The test 
it offers for distinguishing this case from those in which a 
Tonnage Clause violation was found is that the non-vessel 
targets of taxation in those cases – the captain, crew, 
passengers, etc. – were unlike the stevedores here because 
those targets were “representatives of ships” who “travel with 
the ships moving as vehicles in commerce.”  (Majority at 16.)  
According to the Majority, taxes on such people might 
“indirectly impact a vessel’s decisions” as to how and where 
to travel.  (Id.)  But how can it be thought that the Container 
Throughput Rental assessments at issue here will not – in 
theory anyway – do the very same thing?  Maher alleges that, 
at public cargo facilities, the Port Authority collects all fees 
and assessments from the vessels.  By contrast, at leased 
cargo facilities like Maher’s, the “Port Authority collects fees 
and charges … from the terminal operators, which in turn 
collect fees and charges from vessels and cargo using the 
terminals.”  (App. at 3.)  In other words, vessels are charged 
directly at public facilities, and indirectly at leased facilities.  
According to the Majority, that amounts to a constitutional 
difference, with the Tonnage Clause acting as a restraint at 
the former set of facilities but not at the latter.7  It is hard to 
                                              
7 In the case of the Cargo Facility Charge, the Port 
Authority actually requires that the “user of cargo handling 
services” (i.e., the vessels) pay charges “to the Port 
Authority”, but the charge “will be collected by the terminal 
operator”, like Maher, “for remittance to the Port Authority.”  
(App. at 345.)  In other words, Maher is nothing more than 
the collector of such charges directly on behalf of the Port 
Authority, and keeps none of the assessment for itself.  
Presumably, the Majority would have no problem with such a 
levy, even if it otherwise violated the Tonnage Clause, 
  
accept that conclusion, since national and international 
commerce is happening at both types of facilities, and thus 
the concerns motivating the Framers are fully in play at both. 
 
 Of course, the Majority’s distinction places Maher at a 
disadvantage in comparison with public cargo facilities – why 
would a ship avail itself of a Maher terminal subject to 
indirect taxes, when it can have access to public terminals 
where fees can only be charged for services rendered?  And 
the size of Maher’s disadvantage is now at the whim of the 
Port Authority, itself the owner of the competing public cargo 
facilities.  By my colleagues’ reasoning, though, that is of no 
moment.  All the Port Authority needs to do to avoid the 
Tonnage Clause is insert a middleman between itself and the 
vessels to be taxed.  If the Port Authority charges Maher fees 
for the privilege of stevedoring in its port, and Maher passes 
those fees on to the vessels, the vessels themselves have no 
Tonnage Clause claim against the Port Authority because 
their payments, nominally paid to Maher, would not be 
considered taxes.  And the vessels could not sue Maher for a 
Tonnage Clause violation, as it is not a sovereign entity.  
Only Maher can vindicate the Tonnage Clause interests at 
stake here.  But, to the Majority, the Tonnage Clause becomes 
a dead letter once a landside middleman is inserted.  If the 
Port Authority wants to raise some extra revenue, it can do 
exactly that – with this Court’s blessing.  That result 
effectively ignores the Supreme Court’s injunction that “the 
prohibition against tonnage duties … embrace[s] all taxes and 
duties regardless of their name or form … which operate to 
impose a charge for the privilege of entering, trading in, or 
                                                                                                     
because the money first passed through the hands of the 
terminal operator. 
  
lying in a port.”  Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8 (emphasis 
added) (internal quotation marks omitted).   
 
 The scope of constitutional protection should not be 
controlled by the fact that stevedoring services take place on 
land as well as on vessels.  The Supreme Court has 
specifically commented on the necessity to maritime 
commerce of the work done by stevedores: 
 
Transportation of a cargo by water is impossible 
or futile unless the thing to be transported is put 
aboard the ship and taken off at destination.  A 
stevedore who in person or by servants does 
work so indispensable is as much an agency of 
commerce as shipowner or master. Formerly 
the work was done by the ship’s crew; but, 
owing to the exigencies of increasing commerce 
and the demand for rapidity and special skill, it 
has become a specialized service devolving 
upon a class as clearly identified with maritime 
affairs as are the mariners. 
 
Puget Sound Stevedoring Co. v. Tax Comm’n of Wash., 302 
U.S. 90, 92 (1937) (emphasis added) (internal quotation 
marks omitted), overruled by Dept. of Revenue of Wash. v. 
Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 (1978).8  The 
                                              
 
8 In Puget Sound, the Supreme Court struck down the 
State of Washington’s effort to impose a business tax on a 
stevedoring company as a violation of the Commerce Clause.  
302 U.S. 90 (1937).  The Court reasoned that, because “[t]he 
business of loading and unloading” ships constitutes interstate 
commerce, Washington was per se not permitted to impose 
  
Supreme Court has thus already disavowed the distinction 
that today’s Majority draws.  “What is decisive is the nature 
of the act, not the person of the actor.”  Id. at 94.  Cf. 
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288 
(1977) (“[A] focus on that formalism merely obscures the 
question whether the tax produces a forbidden effect.”). 
 
 The Passenger Cases best bear out the point.  One of 
the cases at issue there involved a two-dollar-per-passenger 
assessment, levied on the “master, owner, consignee, or 
                                                                                                     
its tax.  Id. at 94.  When Washington again tried to tax 
stevedores in 1974, the Supreme Court reconsidered and 
overruled its holding in Puget Sound.  See Dept. of Revenue 
of Wash. v. Ass’n of Wash. Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734 
(1978).  In changing the applicable law, the Supreme Court 
did nothing to alter its admonition in Puget Sound concerning 
the importance of stevedores in maritime commerce.  In the 
later case, the Supreme Court reasoned that a tax on interstate 
commercial activity does not offend the Commerce Clause 
when the tax “applied to activity with a substantial nexus with 
the State, that are fairly apportioned, that do not discriminate 
against interstate commerce, and that are fairly related to the 
services provided by the State.”  Id. at 750.  In light of this 
new, fact-intensive approach to challenges to state taxation 
under the Commerce Clause, the Court ultimately upheld the 
Washington tax at issue because “respondents relied below on 
the per se approach of Puget Sound and … [therefore] they 
developed no factual basis on which to declare the 
Washington tax unconstitutional as applied to their members 
and their stevedoring activities.”  Id. at 751.  In neither Puget 
Sound nor Dept. of Revenue of Washington did the Court 
consider the scope or applicability of the Tonnage Clause. 
  
agent” of any vessel landing in the port of Boston, which had 
to be paid before any passengers could disembark.  Passenger 
Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 456.  The Supreme Court 
declared, by a five-to-four vote, that the tax was 
unconstitutional.  Id. at 573.  But with eight justices writing 
separately, the rationale of the Court was left unclear.  Four 
justices relied on the Tonnage Clause, including Justice Grier, 
who concluded that it did not matter whether the tax was 
viewed as “a tax upon passengers or persons,” or as a tax 
upon vessels.  Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 460 
(Grier, J., concurring).  He persuasively discussed why such a 
distinction inevitably breaks down: 
 
It has been argued that this is not a tax on the 
master or the vessel, because in effect it is paid 
by the passenger having enhanced the price of 
his passage.  Let us test the value of this 
argument by its application to other cases that 
naturally suggest themselves.  If this act had, in 
direct terms, compelled the master to pay a tax 
or duty levied or graduated on the ratio of the 
tonnage of his vessel, whose freight was earned 
by the transportation of passengers, it might 
have been said, with equal truth, that the duty 
was paid by the passenger, and not by the 
vessel.  And so, if it had laid an impost on the 
goods of the passenger imported by the vessel, 
it might have been said, with equal reason, it 
was only a tax on the passenger at last, as it 
comes out of his pocket, and, graduating it by 
the amount of his goods, affects only the modus 
or ratio by which its amount is calculated.  In 
this way, the most stringent enactments may be 
  
easily evaded.  It is a just and well-settled 
doctrine established by this court, that a State 
cannot do that indirectly which she is forbidden 
by the Constitution to do directly.  …  The 
Constitution of the United States, and the 
powers confided by it to the general 
government, to be exercised for the benefit of 
all the States, ought not to be nullified or 
evaded by astute verbal criticism, without 
regard to the grand aim and object of the 
instrument, and the principles on which it is 
based. 
 
Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 458-59 (Grier, J., 
concurring) (emphasis added).9  Thus the necessary breadth 
of the Tonnage Clause. 
                                              
 9 More recently, the Second Circuit adhered to this 
principle in Bridgeport & Port Jefferson Steamboat Co. v. 
Bridgeport Port Auth., in holding that a passenger fee 
violated the Tonnage Clause.  567 F.3d 79, 88 (2d Cir. 2009).  
The amount of the passenger fee varied depending upon 
whether the passenger was a person, a car, a truck, or a bus.  
Id. at 83.  Although the passenger fee was collected from 
passengers by the ferry company and thereafter remitted to 
the state, the state reimbursed the ferry company with an 
administrative fee for its trouble.  Id.  The Bridgeport Court 
correctly referred to the passengers as the fee payers, id. at 
88, as the fee was ultimately passed on to passengers in the 
form an increase in ticket prices.  Even though the fee 
represented a small percentage of overall ticket prices – in 
2005 a one-way ferry ticket for a vehicle with unlimited 
passengers was $51.25, while the corresponding passenger 
  
 Justice Grier’s expansive reading of the Tonnage 
Clause has since acquired dispositive weight with the 
endorsement of his position by the Court in Polar Tankers.  
See Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8.  Despite that, my 
colleagues apply an unduly restrictive reading to the Polar 
Tankers decision.  According to them: “What actually made 
the tax in Polar Tankers unconstitutional, and what Maher 
cannot show here, is that the tax was directed at vessels and 
was not in exchange for services.”  (Majority at 20.)  But that 
is not what the Supreme Court said.  Far from limiting its 
reasoning to duties laid on vessels, the Supreme Court 
reiterated that the “prohibition against tonnage duties has 
been deemed to embrace all taxes and duties regardless of 
their name or form, and even though not measured by the 
tonnage of the vessel, which operate to impose a charge for 
the privilege of entering, trading in, or lying in a port.”  Polar 
Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8 (internal quotation omitted).  It would 
be hard to find more sweeping language than the words 
“regardless of their name or form” to describe the prohibited 
taxes, and likewise the words “entering, trading in, or lying in 
a port” seem intended to capture all trade-related activities in 
port.10  Id.  The Majority’s restrictive reading of Polar 
                                                                                                     
fee was $2.75, id. at 83 – the Second Circuit recognized that 
such a fee charged to passengers, with no corresponding 
benefit to them, was impermissible under the Tonnage 
Clause. 
 10 My colleagues warn that, if we unmoor the Tonnage 
Clause from taxes on vessels, then landside entities having 
some relationship to maritime commerce would be able to 
challenge any unreasonable state-imposed fees for the 
privilege of doing business at a port.  For example, they say, a 
restaurant renting state property in a port could state a claim 
  
Tankers is at odds with the reasoning and language of the 
decision itself. 
 
Although the present case involves a cargo throughput 
assessment levied on a stevedoring operation, conceptually, 
there is no difference between that and the fee levied in the 
Passenger Cases.11  The Port Authority is “‘do[ing] that 
indirectly which [it] is forbidden ... to do directly,’” evading 
                                                                                                     
under the Tonnage Clause by claiming that its rent is 
unreasonably high given the services provided by the state.  
That hypothetical misses the mark by a wide margin.  To 
begin with, a rental fee is clearly reimbursement for a service 
rendered: providing the property on which the lessee can 
conduct its business.  Further, unlike the restaurateur from the 
Majority’s hypothetical, Maher does not have merely some 
tenuous relationship to maritime commerce.  Maher is 
directly engaged in it.  As the Supreme Court recognized in 
Puget Sound, such commerce could not occur without 
stevedores like Maher to load and unload seaborne cargo.  
The faithful construction of the Tonnage Clause that I 
propose will not, as the Majority fears, encompass disputes 
unrelated to volumetric charges.  It will, instead, avoid 
arbitrary line-drawing that forecloses claims by entities that 
are clearly within the Tonnage Clause’s zone of interest. 
 11 The Majority implicitly recognizes as much.  It 
announces that the Tonnage Clause applies to taxes on 
passengers because such duties “will likely indirectly impact 
a vessel’s decisions by reducing demand,” but then, 
inconsistently, says that the Clause does not apply to a fee on 
Maher because such a fee “does not in and of itself impact a 
vessel’s ability to freely navigate in commerce.”  (Majority at 
16.) 
  
the Tonnage Clause “‘by producing a dictionary or a dictum 
to prove that a [marine terminal operator] is not a vessel, nor 
a [stevedore] an import.’”  Polar Tankers, 557 U.S. at 8 
(quoting Passenger Cases, 48 U.S. (7 How.) at 458, 459 
(Grier, J., concurring)).12 
                                              
 12 While I dissent from my colleagues’ narrow reading 
of the Tonnage Clause, I have no disagreement with their 
conclusion that the Basic Rental assessment does not violate 
that constitutional provision.  The Basic Rental assessment, 
unlike the Container Throughput Rental, is more properly 
considered a fee for services rendered than a revenue-raising 
tax.  The Port Authority owns the marine terminal and is 
entitled to “just compensation for the use of such property.”  
Cannon, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) at 582.  Although the Basic 
Rental constitutes a fee for services, on the facts alleged by 
Maher, the Container Throughput Rental does not.  
According to Maher’s complaint, the fees charged in the 
Container Throughput Rental “substantially exceed the costs 
of services provided by the Port Authority to the cargo or 
vessels” and “escalate at two to three year intervals without 
corresponding increases in the level of services provided by 
the Port Authority to the cargo or vessels.”  (App. at 42.)  The 
fees are used to “subsidize other terminals” and “for other 
purposes not benefiting the vessels and cargo that use 
Maher’s container terminal, including but not limited to, 
expenses to purchase and develop marine terminals for 
vessels that do not or cannot use Maher’s container terminal.”  
(App. at 44.)  Also, the Container Throughput Rentals vary by 
the volume of cargo that is loaded and unloaded at Maher’s 
terminal – thus striking at the very heart of the concerns 
motivating the Tonnage Clause – while any services provided 
do not.  Maher pays a higher Container Throughput Rental 
  
 In sum, the Majority errs in giving the Tonnage Clause 
a singularly narrow reading, and I would reverse the portion 
of the District Court’s order that is based on that same errant 
view of the Constitution. 
                                                                                                     
the more cargo it unloads, and, according to its Complaint, 
receives nothing from the Port Authority in return. 
 To the extent the District Court held that “most (if not 
all) of the rental charges and fees imposed by Port Authority 
against Maher would likely be the type of charges for services 
rendered that fall outside the Tonnage Clause’s scope” (App. 
at 12-13 (internal quotations omitted)), it did not view the 
facts in the light most favorable to and draw all reasonable 
inferences in favor of Maher.  In its Complaint, Maher 
repeatedly emphasized the disconnect between the amount 
paid and the services rendered, but the District Court did not 
adequately credit Maher’s assertions. 
